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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
This memorandum examines the jurisprudence in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) concerning the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise.1 Part II of the memorandum begins with a brief overview of the background
of and context in which joint criminal enterprise was developed. Part III contains
analysis of the cases in which joint criminal enterprise is dealt with substantially by both
the ICTY Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber. The focus of this part will be the
legal holdings regarding the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and how it is applied to
the factual findings of the respective cases. The cases deal with a wide array of
allegations pertaining to individuals spanning from lower-level civilians (such as taxi
drivers) to prominent officials (such as the president of Yugoslavia). Part IV will
conclude this memorandum with a summary of the ICTY holdings regarding the doctrine
of joint criminal enterprise.

Summary of Conclusions
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic, after examining post-World War II cases, found
that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is firmly established in customary
international law and in addition is implicitly supported by the Statute of the International
Tribunal itself. Joint criminal enterprise is a way of imputing guilt to a person who
participates in a form of collective criminal activity. The Appeals Chamber laid out three
distinct categories of joint criminal enterprise, along with the required actus reus and
mens rea, which differs for each category. The first category includes cases where all co-

1

The issue I was given is as follows: Joint criminal enterprise: What is the degree of participation required
for conviction? We would appreciate an exhaustive memo of the jurisprudence on joint criminal enterprise.
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defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention.
The second category includes the “concentration camp” cases in which offences were
alleged to have been committed by members of military or administrative units such as
those running concentration camps; i.e., by groups of persons acting pursuant to a
concerted plan. The third category involves cases in which perpetrators, acting in
furtherance of a common design, commit an act which, while outside the common design,
was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of that common
purpose. The actus reus for joint criminal enterprise, which is the same for each
category, is a plurality of persons, the existence of a common plan, design or purpose
which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute, and
Participation of the accused in the common design. The mens rea for the first category is
intent to perpetrate a specific crime; the next category requires the accused to have
personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment as well as the intent to further this
concerted system of ill-treatment; and the third category requires the intent to participate
in and further the criminal activity or purpose and to contribute to the joint criminal
enterprise or to the commission of the crime. In addition, responsibility for a crime other
than the one agreed upon in the common plan arises only if it was foreseeable that such a
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and the accused
willingly took that risk.
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II. Factual Background
The ICTY was established by U.N. Security Council mandate pursuant to its
authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.2 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
Tribunal lays out several forms of individual criminal responsibility that apply to all the
crimes falling within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The provision reads as follows:

Article 7
Individual criminal responsibility
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.3

The ICTY has created, through its case law, another type of complicity or
participation, known as “joint criminal enterprise”.4 The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor
v. Tadic acknowledged that joint criminal enterprise liability is not included within the
“enumeration of forms of participation” in article 7(1).5 However, the Appeals Chamber
in Tadic referred to a Secretary General’s Report stating that “all persons who participate
in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such
violations.”6 The Appeals Chamber buttresses the Secretary General’s Report by stating

2

See U.N.S.C Res. 827, adopted May 25, 1993 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]; U.N.
Charter Chapter VII [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34]
3

See also Articles 2-5 of the Statute [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

4

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL (Continuum New York 2002) (hereinafter
“Scharf”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]
5

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Judgment in Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter
“Tadic Judgment”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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that all those who engaged in such humanitarian law violations, “whatever the manner in
which they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration of those violations,
must be brought to justice.”7 Most of the common crimes in wartime situations are
carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common design.8 As a
result, applying criminal liability as a co-perpetrator or as an aider and abettor as
provided in Article 7 of the Statute would not suffice. For example, if the person who
physically performs the act is held criminally liable, then the role of all those who made
the criminal act possible as co-perpetrators would be disregarded. However, “to hold the
latter liable as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their criminal
responsibility.”9 As a result, the joint criminal enterprise theory was developed.

III. Legal Discussion - Status of Joint Criminal Enterprise
A. Development of Joint Criminal Enterprise
Simply put, a joint criminal enterprise has developed when two or more persons
have an agreement, even if it is only inferred and of which there is no direct proof, to
carry out a crime.10 When the person actually commits a crime or assists or encourages
another to commit the crime, then that individual can be considered to actually participate

6

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 190 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]; citing Report
of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc.
S/25704, 3 May 1993
7

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 190 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

8

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 191 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

9

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 192 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

10

SCHARF, supra note 4 at 120 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

9

in a joint criminal enterprise.11 In addition, an individual may be guilty for the acts that
others commit in pursuance of the criminal enterprise, regardless of the part he or she
plays in the commission of the crime.12
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic, when articulating the theory of joint criminal
enterprise, relied largely on jurisprudence derived from the post-World War II
Nuremberg trials. The Appeals Chamber derived from customary international law three
categories of joint activity that could subject a perpetrator to liability for the acts of
others.13 The first category is where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common
design, possess the same criminal intention. For example, the co-perpetrators have a plan
to kill, “where, in effecting this common design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries
out a different role within it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill.”14 The
Appeals Chamber pointed to a few cases establishing this category, beginning with the
Almelo Trial in which a British court found three Germans guilty of killing a British
prisoner of war under the doctrine of “common enterprise”.15 The court reasoned that the
three Germans were co-perpetrators of murder since they all had the intent to kill the

11

SCHARF, supra note 4 at 120 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

12

SCHARF, supra note 4 at 120 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

13

Richard P. Barrett, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in International
Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 39 (November 2003) (hereinafter “Barrett”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
14

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 196 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

15

See Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals,
Almelo, Holland, on 24th-26th November, 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 35 (hereinafter “Almelo Trial”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]; cited in Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 197
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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British soldier even though only one of the co-perpetrators inflicted the fatal blow.16 The
Judge Advocate also stated that if the individuals were all present at the same time taking
part in an unlawful common enterprise, each one assisting the common purpose of all,
then they were all equally guilty in law.17 This theory of common purpose was extended
in the Schonfeld case in which ten Germans were charged with killing a member of the
Royal Air Force, a member of the Royal Canadian Air Force and a member of the Royal
Australian Air Force.18 The three airmen were unarmed and hiding in a home when they
were killed in a raid.19 The Judge Advocate stated:
“If several persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to be
effected by unlawful means, and one of them, in carrying out the purpose, kills a man, it
is murder in all who are present, whether they actually aid or abet or not, provided that
the death was caused by a member of the party in the course of his endeavors to effect the
common object of the assembly.”20
The Appeals Chamber noted that other post-World War II trials held in other
countries, in particular Italy and Germany, used the same theory of liability but used the
theory of co-perpetration instead of common purpose or common design.21
The second category is referred to as the “concentration camp cases” mainly
because they deal with cases in which common purpose liability is applied to offenses
alleged to have been committed by “members of military or administrative units such as
16

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 197 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

17

Almelo Trial, supra note 15 at 40 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]; see also Tadic
Judgment, supra note 5 at note 234 at 84 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
18

Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British Military Court, Essen, June 11-26, 1946, UNWCC, vol. XI,
p. 64 (hereinafter “Schonfeld case”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]; cited in Tadic
Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 198 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

19

Schonfeld case, supra note 18 at 64 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]

20

Schonfeld case, supra note 18 at 68 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]; see also Tadic
Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 198 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

21

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 201 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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those running concentration camps; i.e. by groups of persons acting pursuant to a
concerted plan.”22 The Appeals Chamber in Tadic relied on two cases in describing this
category. The first is the Dachau Concentration Camp case, in which members of the
Dachau Concentration Camp were charged with participation in a common design to
mistreat the prisoners.23 In order to establish a case against each accused the prosecution
had to show (1) that there was a system in place to mistreat the prisoners and commit the
crimes, (2) that each accused was aware of the system, and (3) that each accused, by his
conduct, “encouraged, aided and abetted or participated ” in enforcing this system.24 The
court found that there existed in the camp a general system of cruelties and murders of
the inmates and that the members of the staff had knowledge of the system and actively
participated in the system.25 The second case on which the Appeals Chamber relied, the
Belsen case, also dealt with allegations of mistreatment, physical suffering and death of
prisoners in the camps at Auschwitz and Belsen.26 The Appeals Chamber in Tadic
pointed out that the Judge Advocate in Belsen adopted three requirements for establishing
guilt, which were almost identical to the ones laid out in the Dachau case: 1) a system

22

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 202 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

23

Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others, General Military Government Court of the United
States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15 November – 13 December, 1945, UNWCC, p. 12 (hereinafter “Dachau
Concentration Camp case”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

24

Dachau Concentration Camp case, supra note 23 at 13 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
29]

25

See Dachau Concentration Camp case, supra note 23 at 15: “Such a course of conduct, then, was held by
the court in this case to constitute ‘acting in pursuance of a common design to violate the laws and usages
of war.’ Everybody who took any part in such common design was held guilty of a war crime, though the
nature and extent of the participation may vary.”

26

Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court, Luneberg, 17th September-17th November,
1945, UNWCC, vol. II, p. 1 [hereinafter the “Belsen case”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
26]
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organized to mistreat the prisoners; 2) the accused was aware of the system; and 3) the
accused in some way participated in enforcing the system.27 The Judge Advocate in
Belsen found that the camp staff knew a system and course of conduct was in place and
the staff was deliberately taking part in a common design to mistreat the detainees.28
Finally, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic described a third category of joint criminal
enterprise, consisting of cases involving a common design where one of the perpetrators
commits an act which was outside the common design but is nevertheless a natural and
foreseeable consequence of carrying out the common design.29 The Appeals Chamber
explained that an example of this category would be a common, shared intention to
commit ethnic cleansing by forcibly removing people of a certain ethnicity from their
homes and towns. If someone is killed during the ethnic cleansing, then criminal
responsibility can be imputed to all members within the common enterprise because the
killing was a predictable consequence of the enterprise.30 The two cases used by the
Appeals Chamber to illustrate this category are the Essen Lynching case and the Borkum
Island case. These cases deal with “mob violence”, that is, where multiple offenders
each commit offenses against a victim, “but where it is unknown or impossible to
ascertain exactly which acts were carried out by which perpetrator, or when the causal
link between each act and the eventual harm caused to the victims is similarly
indeterminate.”31

27

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 202 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

28

Belsen case, supra note 26 at p. 121 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]

29

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 204 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

30

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 204 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

31

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 205 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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In the Essen Lynching case decided by the British Military Court, a German
captain, a German soldier, and five civilians were charged with brutally killing three
prisoners of war.32 As the prisoners were being transported under control of the soldier,
the captain announced to a crowd that had gathered that the soldier guarding the prisoners
was under orders not to prevent civilians from attacking the prisoners, adding that the
prisoners ought to be shot. The soldiers led the prisoners through the streets as members
of the crowd repeatedly struck them and threw sticks and stones at them. An unknown
German soldier even wounded a prisoner by shooting him. Members of the crowd then
threw the prisoners off a bridge. Those who did not die from the fall were killed by the
members of the crowd.33
The prosecution in the Essen Lynching case argued that it is impossible to
separate one aggressive action from another; therefore, every person who took action
against the prisoners “is guilty in that he is concerned in the killing.” The prosecution
also argued that proving the intent of each of the accused is not necessary because an
unlawful killing, such as manslaughter, may exist where there is no intent to kill but
merely the doing of an unlawful act of violence.34 Even though not all of the accused had
the intent to kill, they were all found guilty of murder because they were all “concerned
in the killing.” The court agreed with the prosecution finding that the persons who struck

32

Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18th19th and 21st-22nd December, 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 89 (hereinafter “Essen Lynching case”) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]; See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 207 (citing Essen Lynching
case) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
33

Essen Lynching case, supra note 32 at p. 89 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]

34

See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 207, 208 (citing Essen Lynching case p. 89) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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the prisoners or implicitly incited the murder could have foreseen that others would kill
the prisoners; therefore, they too were guilty of murder.35
In the Borkum Island case, a U.S. military court ruled in a very similar manner to
the British court in the Essen Lynching case.36 A U.S. military plane was shot down on
the German island of Borkum.37 The seven crew members were taken prisoner and
marched through the city during which members of the Reich’s Labour Corps beat the
prisoners with shovels at the order of a German officer. The town’s mayor further incited
the mob and the civilians beat the prisoners while the escorting guards either watched or
took part. The German soldiers then executed the prisoners. The accused, which
consisted of the German soldiers, the mayor, a civilian and some policemen, were
charged with “willfully, deliberately and wrongfully encouraging, aiding abetting and
participating” in the assaults upon and the killing of the prisoners.38
The prosecution argued that not all of the accused participated in the same
manner; instead, “it is the composite of the actions of all the accused that results in the
crime.”39 In other words, the prosecution argued that there was no distinction between
those who caused the victims to be subject to the mob, those who incited the mob, and

35

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 209 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

36

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 210 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

37

See Kurt Goebell et al. Charge Sheet, in U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, I (on file with
the International Tribunal’s Library) (hereinafter “Borkum Island case”), cited in Tadic Judgment, supra
note 5 at ¶ 210 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
38

See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 210 (citing Borkum Island case) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 23]
39

See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 210 (citing Borkum Island case, p. 1186) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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those who dealt the fatal blows.40 The prosecution described the accused as “cogs in the
wheel of common design”, all equally important to the “wheel of murder”.41 All the
accused were found guilty of pursuing a criminal common design, whereas some were
also found guilty of murder.42 According to the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, “presumably,
this was on the basis that the accused, whether by virtue of their status, role or conduct,
were in a position to have predicted that the assault would lead to the killing of the
victims by some of those participating in the assault.”43
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic continued its development of joint criminal
enterprise by analyzing some cases brought before Italian courts after World War II
regarding war crimes committed by military personnel belonging to the “Repubblica
Sociale Italiana” (“RSI”).44 In D’Ottavio et al., some armed civilians had been chasing
two prisoners of war who had escaped from a concentration camp. During the chase, one
civilian shot a prisoner without intending to kill him, but the prisoner died as a result of
the shooting. The Italian Court of Cassation held that the members of the civilian group
were guilty of both “illegal restraint” and manslaughter.45 The court went on to state that
there must exist a material and psychological causal nexus between the result intended by

40

See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 210 (citing Borkum Island case, p. 1186) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
41

See Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 210 (citing Borkum Island case, p. 1186) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
42

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 213 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

43

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 213 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

44

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 214 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

45

See D’Ottavio et al, cited in Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 215 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 23]
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the group and the different actions carried out by an individual of the group.46 The court
further stated that the psychological causality existed “as all the participants had the
intent to perpetrate and knowledge of the actual perpetration of an attempted illegal
restraint, and foresaw the possible commission of a different crime.”47
In the Aratano et al. case, a group of RSI militiamen were arresting a group of
partisans when one of the militiamen, intending to scare the group, fired a few shots into
the air. This prompted the partisans to shoot back which quickly escalated into a shootout in which one of the partisans was killed.48 The Court of Cassation, reversing the trial
court, held that the militiamen did not intend to kill the partisans and were not guilty of
murder. The court held that “the murder of one of the partisans was an unintended event
and consequently could not be attributed to all the participants.”49
With regard to the required causal nexus, the Court of Cassation in Mannelli
explained that “for there to be a relationship of material causality between the crime
willed by one of the participants and the different crime committed by another, it is
necessary that the latter crime should constitute the logical and predictable development
of the former.”50 Instead, if there exists full independence between the two crimes, one

46

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 215 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

47

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 215 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

48

Aratano et al., cited in Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 216 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23]

49

Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 216 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

50

See Guistizia penale , 1950, Part II, cols. 696-697, cited in Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 218
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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may find, depending on the particular circumstances, that a merely incidental relationship
exists.51
After analyzing this case law, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic concluded that “the
notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in
customary international law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of
the International Tribunal.”52
While the notion of common design is established in customary international law,
it is also rooted in the national law of many states.53 Countries such as Germany and the
Netherlands follow the principle that where multiple persons participate in a common
purpose or common design with the same intent to perpetrate the crime envisaged in the
common purpose, then all are responsible for the ensuing criminal conduct. If one of the
participants commits a crime not envisaged in the common purpose, then he alone will
incur responsibility for the crime.54 Other countries, such as civil law countries France
and Italy and common law countries England and Wales, Canada, the United States,
Australia and Zambia, also take the position that persons taking part in a common plan to
commit a crime are all criminally responsible for the crime, whatever the role they each
played. However, these countries generally find that if one of the persons taking part in
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the common plan commits a crime that is outside the common plan, then all the persons
are fully liable for the offense so long as the offense was foreseeable.55
The Appeals Chambers found that the “consistency and cogency of the case law
coupled with the general principles on criminal responsibility laid down in both the
Statute and general international criminal law and in national legislation, warrant
conclusion that case law reflects customary rules of international criminal law.”56 The
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case then took an important step when it laid out the first
and most important ruling in the International Tribunals on the theory of joint criminal
enterprise.

B. The Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic stated:
In sum, the objective elements (actus reus) of this mode of participation in
one of the crimes provided for in the Statute (with regard to each of the three
categories of cases) are as follows57:
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organized in a military, political or
administrative structure, as is shown by the Essen Lynching case.
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or
involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no
necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged or
formulated. The common plan or purpose may materialize extemporaneously and
be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect
a joint criminal enterprise.
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 224 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 5 at ¶ 226 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration
of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not
involve commission of a specific crime under one of those provisions (for
example, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form of
assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose.58

The first category is commonly referred to as the “basic” form of joint criminal
enterprise, the second is known as the “systemic” form,59 while the third category is
referred to as an “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise.60 The Appeals Chamber in
Krnojelac concisely summarized the mens rea requirements laid out in the Tadic case:

“The Appeals Chamber considered that the mens rea differs according to the
category of common design under consideration”:
- The first category of cases requires the intent to perpetrate a specific crime (this
intent being shared by all the co-perpetrators).
- For the second category which, as noted above, is a variant of the first, the
accused must have personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment (whether
proven by express testimony or inferred from the accused’s position of authority),
as well as the intent to further this concerted system of ill-treatment.
- The third category requires the intent to participate in and further the criminal
activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal
enterprise or, in any event, to the commission of a crime by the group. In addition,
responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan
arises only if, in the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the
accused willingly took that risk.61
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The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No: IT-97-25, Judgment 17 September 2003 (hereinafter “Krnojelac
Judgment”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]

60

The Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No: IT-95-9-T, Judgment 17 October 2003 (hereinafter “Simic
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The Appeals Chamber in Tadic then distinguished between acting in pursuance of
a common purpose or design to commit a crime on the one hand and aiding and abetting
on the other62:
(i) The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another
person, the principal.
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of a
common concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or
agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the
accomplice’s contribution.
(iii) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage
or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder,
extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this
support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in
the case of acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design, it is sufficient for
the participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of
the common plan or purpose.
(iv) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge
that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific
crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of common purpose or design
more is required (i.e., either intent to perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the
common criminal design plus foresight that those crimes outside the criminal
common purpose were likely to be committed), as stated above.63

This holding by the Appeals Chamber has had far-reaching effects. As one author
has stated, joint criminal enterprise has become “the magic bullet of the Office of the
Prosecutor”.64 The following will contain summaries of the cases that dealt substantially
with joint criminal enterprise, beginning with Tadic.
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William Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1032 (Summer 2003) (hereinafter “Schabas”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 4]
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C. Tadic
The judgment in the first international war crimes trial since World War II
involved a Bosnian-Serb café owner, karate instructor and part-time traffic cop named
Dusko Tadic.65 One of the thirty-one charges against Tadic was for the murder of five
men in the village of Jaskici.66 The Prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s
determination that it could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
had any part in the killings that took place in the village of Jaskici.67 The prosecution
argued that because Tadic participated in the attack on Sivci and Jaskici and because the
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Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
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“This Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was a member of the
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that four of them were shot in the head, nothing is known as to who shot them or in what
circumstances. It is not irrelevant that their deaths occurred on the same day and at about the same
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been the act of a quite distinct group of armed men, or the unauthorized and unforeseen act of one
of the force that entered Sivci, for which the accused cannot be held responsible, that caused their
death.”
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impetus behind the attack was to rid the region of Prijedor of the non-Serb population by
committing inhumane and violent acts, “the only conclusion reasonably open from all the
evidence is that the killing of the five victims was entirely predictable as part of the
natural and probable consequences of the attack.”68 As a result, Tadic should have been
found guilty under Article 7(1) of the Statute regardless of who actually killed the five
victims.69 The defense contended that it must be shown that the common purpose in the
attack in which Tadic allegedly participated included killing as opposed to ethnic
cleansing and that it was not possible to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic was
involved in a criminal enterprise with the design of killing.70
After finding that the armed group to which Tadic belonged killed the five men in
Jaskici,71 the Appeals Chamber set out to determine “whether under international
criminal law the Appellant can be held criminally responsible for the killing of the five
men in Jaskici even though there is no evidence that he personally killed any of them.”72
The Appeals Chamber decided that the Trial Chamber erred in holding that it could not
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic had any part in the killing of the five
men from Jaskici.73 The common criminal purpose, the Appeals Chamber reasoned, was
not to kill all non-Serb men, although killings frequently occurred in the effort to rid the
Prijedor region of the non-Serb population. The context in which the Trial Chamber
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should have seen the attack on Jaskici and Tadic’s participation therein was that Tadic
“had been aware of the killings accompanying the commission of inhumane acts against
the non-Serb population.”74 The Appeals Chamber found that Tadic participated in the
five killings in Jaskici, which were committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civil population; therefore, the Trial Chamber should have found Tadic guilty
under the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Statute.75 The Appeals Chamber would later
comment in Mulitinovic that joint criminal enterprise formed the sole legal basis upon
which Tadic was convicted.76

D. Ojdanic
Some very helpful guidance regarding joint criminal enterprise recently emerged
from the Appeals Chambers’ decision in the Ojdanic case. Ojdanic was charged as a coperpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise the purpose of which was the expulsion of the
Kosovo Albanian population from the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure
continued Serbian control over the territory.77 In one of his grounds for appeal, Ojdanic
argued that joint criminal enterprise does not come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.78
Although the Tadic case already stated that joint criminal enterprise was provided for in
the Statute and did exist under customary international law, Ojdanic argued that the
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drafters of the Statute did not explicitly include joint criminal enterprise, therefore, it was
their intention to exclude such a form of liability. The Appeals Chamber disagreed. It
first noted that the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is determined by
both the Statute and by customary international law, insofar as the crime listed in the
Statute exists at the time the crime was allegedly committed.79 The Appeals Chamber
then explained that while the Statute sets out the framework within which the Tribunal
may exercise jurisdiction, a crime or a form of liability does not need to be explicit to
come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. “The Statute of the ICTY is not and does not
purport to be, unlike for instance the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a
meticulously detailed code providing explicitly for every possible scenario and every
solution thereto.”80 Rather, it sets out in “somewhat general terms” the jurisdictional
framework within which the Tribunal may operate.81 The Appeals Chamber pointed out
that Article 7(1) is non-exhaustive in nature, as is evident by the phrase “or otherwise
aided and abetted”. As a result, the Appeals Chamber was satisfied that joint criminal
enterprise is included within the terms of Article 7(1).
The Appeals Chamber in Ojdanic next considered the prosecution’s indictment,
which stated that the use of the word “committed” did not intend to suggest that Ojdanic
physically perpetrated the crimes charged.82 Instead, the prosecution used the word
“committed” to refer to participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a co-perpetrator.83
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The Appeals Chamber held that the prosecution’s approach was “correct to the extent
that, insofar as a participant shares the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise (as he or
she must do) as opposed to merely knowing about it, he or she cannot be regarded as a
mere aider and abettor to the crime which is contemplated.”84 The Appeals Chamber
thus regarded joint criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” pursuant to Article
7(1).85
Ojdanic also argued that the absence of “conspiracy” from the Statute was
evidence that the drafters intended to exclude joint criminal enterprise from the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber disagreed, pointing out that joint
criminal enterprise and conspiracy are two different forms of liability.86 The Appeals
Chamber stated:
Whilst conspiracy requires a showing that several individuals have agreed to
commit a certain crime or set of crimes, a joint criminal enterprise requires, in
addition to such a showing, that the parties to that agreement took action in
furtherance of that agreement. In other words, while mere agreement is sufficient
in the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise
will depend on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that enterprise.
Thus even if it were conceded that conspiracy was excluded from the realm of the
Tribunal’s Statute, that would have no impact on the presence of joint criminal
enterprise as a form of “commission” pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute.87
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The Appeals Chamber, consistent with its holding in Tadic, insisted that joint
criminal enterprise was both provided for in the Statute and existed under customary
international law at the relevant time in regard to Ojdanic’s case.88

E. Krstic
General Radislav Krstic, the former Commander of the elite Drina Corps of the
Bosnian Serb Army, was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
arising out of the events following the downfall of Srebrenica.89 On July 12, 1995, men,
women and children in Potocari were forcibly separated from each other. Some 25,000
Muslim women and children were transported out of the territory while the men were
forced into makeshift holding quarters such as schools, warehouses and trucks. On July
13, Serb soldiers herded at least 1,000 into a warehouse and murdered them. Over the
next few days, Serb soldiers captured and slaughtered thousands of other men in carefully
orchestrated mass executions that followed a well-established pattern90
Krstic was found guilty of being a member of a joint criminal enterprise whose
objective was to forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from
Potocari. As a result, Krstic also incurred liability for the incidental murders, rapes,
beatings and abuses committed in the execution of this criminal enterprise.91 The Trial
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Chamber determined that Krstic participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill the
Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica from the evening of July 13 onward. The court
acknowledged that Krstic may not have devised the killing plan or made the decision to
destroy the Bosnian Muslims through a criminal enterprise, “but there can be no doubt
that, from the point he learned of the widespread and systematic killings and became
clearly involved in their perpetration, he shared the genocidal intent to kill the men.”92
The Trial Chamber then found that Krstic’s intent to kill the Bosnian Muslim
men rose to the level of an intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim
group. Krstic was “undeniably aware” of the dramatic impact that killing the men would
have on the ability of the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica to survive. As a
result, Krstic participated “in genocidal acts of killing members of the group under
Article 4(2)(a) with the intent to destroy part of the group.”93 Krstic was held
responsible for the killings and for causing serious bodily and mental harm as a coparticipant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide. While the objective of the
joint criminal enterprise was the actual killing of the Bosnian Muslim men, the terrible
bodily harm and mental suffering of victims was clearly a natural and foreseeable result
of the enterprise.94
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Ultimately, the Trial Chamber held that Krstic’s behavior rendered him culpable
under joint criminal enterprise theory.95 Krstic planned and forcibly caused refugees to
flee Potocari and, as Commander of the Drina Corps, effectively participated in
executions by rendering “tangible and substantial assistance and technical support.”96
The court found that there was “no basis for refusing to accord the status of a coperpetrator to a member of a joint criminal enterprise whose participation is of an
extremely significant nature and at the leadership level.”97 The Trial Chamber
concluded:
In the present case, General Krstic participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill
the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica with the awareness that
such killings would lead to the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim
community at Srebrenica. His intent to kill the men thus amounts to a genocidal
intent to destroy the group in part. General Krstic did not conceive the plan to kill
the men, nor did he kill them personally. However, he fulfilled a key coordinating
role in the implementation of the killing campaign. In particular, at a stage when
his participation was clearly indispensable, General Krstic exerted his authority as
Drina Corps Commander and arranged for men under his command to commit
killings. He thus was an essential participant in the genocidal killings in the
aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica. In sum, in view of both his mens rea and actus
reus, General Krstic must be considered a principal perpetrator of these crimes.98

It is important to note that the defense argued that the Trial Chamber could not
apply the joint criminal enterprise doctrine because it was not pleaded in the indictment.99
The Trial Chamber rejected this argument; therefore, the prosecution need not necessarily
explicitly plead this theory of responsibility in the indictment. The Trial Chamber
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convicted Krstic of murders as violations of the laws or customs of war, murders as
crimes against humanity, extermination, and murders as acts of persecution.

F. Kvocka
The Kvocka case dealt with five accused men who worked in or regularly visited
the Omarska prison camp. During the camp’s three months of operation, over 3,000 men
and thirty-six women were detained in the Omarska camp. Physical and mental abuses,
murder, torture and rape were rampant throughout the camp as the detainees were subject
to inhumane treatment.100 The accused in the case were Miroslav Kvocka, a Serb police
officer who worked at the camp and had some degree of control over the guards;
Draglojub Prcac, a retired policeman who worked at the camp for about twenty-two days
as an administrative aid of the Omarska camp commander; Milojica Kos, a guard shift
leader in the camp; Mlaco Radic, who also served as a guard shift leader during the entire
three months the camp was operational; and Zoran Zigic, a taxi driver who would
frequented the Omarska camp to abuse the detainees.101 These five men were charged
with persecuting non-Serb detainees in the Omarska camp through a wide range of
abuses such as murder, torture and beating, sexual assault and rape, humiliation and
psychological abuse and confinement in inhumane conditions.102
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In Kvocka, the Trial Chamber elaborated extensively on the theories of joint
criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. The Trial Chamber began
by affirming its ruling that joint criminal enterprise can still be applied even if it has not
been explicitly plead in the Amended Indictment. The Appeals Chamber agreed stating:
“Although greater specificity in drafting indictments is desirable, failure to identify
expressly the exact mode of participation is not necessarily fatal to an indictment if it
nevertheless makes clear to the accused the nature and cause of the charge against
him.”103
While all three joint criminal enterprise categories laid out in Tadic104 are
applicable to this case to some degree, the Trial Chamber decided that the second
category, the “concentration camp” cases, fit best with the facts of the case.105 Because
none of the accused in this case was organizers of the camps or in a high-level position
within the military, the Trial Chamber focused its attention on the participation of lowerlevel actors in a criminal enterprise.106 After analyzing the Dachau Concentration Camp
case and the Einsatzgruppen case107, the Trial Chamber extracts the theory that “criminal
liability will attach to staff members of the concentration camps who have knowledge of
the crimes being committed there, unless their role is not ‘administrative’ or ‘advisory’ or
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‘interwoven with illegality’ or, unless despite having a significant status, their actual
contributions to the enterprise was insignificant.”108
While the Tadic decision drew the distinction between aiding and abetting a crime
and acting in pursuance of a joint criminal enterprise, it did not explain exactly how a
person could aid and abet a criminal enterprise.109 The Trial Chamber in Kvocka
addressed this issue by finding that a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise shares
the intent to carry out the enterprise and performs an act or omission in furtherance of the
enterprise, while an aider and abettor of a joint criminal enterprise need only be aware
that his contribution is assisting or facilitating a crime committed by the enterprise. If an
aider or abettor’s participation lasts for an extensive period of time or becomes more
involved in maintaining the functioning of the enterprise, then that person may become a
co-perpetrator.110 According to the Trial Chamber, “once the evidence indicates that a
person who substantially assists the enterprise shares the goals of the enterprise, he
becomes a co-perpetrator.”111
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The Trial Chamber in Kvocka then proceeded to assess the level of participation
needed to incur criminal responsibility as either an aider and abettor or a co-perpetrator in
a criminal enterprise.112 The court began by analyzing post-World War II trials, much the
same way the Appeals Chamber did in Tadic. The Trial Chamber first examined the
Stalag Luft III case, in which recaptured Allied prisoners of war were executed by axis
powers to serve as a deterrent to other POW’s who might attempt to escape.113 The
prosecution argued that regardless of the position the accused held, they were all involved
in the killing of prisoners of war and were all acting for a common purpose.114 The
defense took the position that the accused were merely low-level actors following orders
and that they would be punished if they disobeyed. The court in Stalag Luft III held that
the accused’s position was not relevant and held them to be “concerned in the killing”
and thus criminally responsible if the function they served satisfied the following criteria:
“[T]he persons concerned must have been part of the machine doing some duty, carrying
out some performance which went on directly to achieve the killing, that it had some real
bearing on the killing, would not have been so effective or been done so expeditiously if
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that person had not contributed his willing aid.”115 The standard, therefore, was whether
the accused’s participation made it easier and more efficient to commit the crimes.116
The Trial Chamber in Kvocka next analyzed the Almelo case117, which dealt with
the killing of a British prisoner of war. The accused, a wide range of individuals who
followed orders to kill the POW, were subject to collective responsibility. The court in
Almelo held: “If people were all present together at the same time, taking part in a
common enterprise which was unlawful, each one in their own way assisting the common
purpose of all, they were all equally guilty in law.”118 Each of the accused performed
their role even with the knowledge that the POW would be executed.119
After considering four more post-World War II cases,120 the Trial Chamber in
Kvocka noted that criminal liability was attributed to mere drivers or ordinary soldiers
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made to stand guard while others performed the executions.121 The court further
concluded:
These cases make clear that when a detention facility is operated in a manner
which makes the discriminatory and persecutory intent of the operation patently
clear, anyone who knowingly participates in any significant way in the operation
of the facility or assists or facilitates its activity, incurs individual criminal
responsibility for participation in the criminal enterprise, either as a co-perpetrator
or an aider and abettor, depending upon his position in the organizational
hierarchy and the degree of his participation.122

The Trial Chamber then performed an in-depth analysis the requirements for midto low-level participants in a joint criminal enterprise. It held that for persons who work
in a job or participate in a system in which crimes are committed on a large scale and on
a systematic basis to incur criminal liability, they must “knowingly participate in the
criminal endeavor and their acts or omissions must significantly assist or facilitate the
commission of the crimes.”123 The participation in the enterprise must be significant
enough to make an enterprise efficient or effective – i.e., “a participation that enables the
system to run more smoothly or without disruption.”124 The level of participation
attributed to the accused and whether that level is deemed significant will depend on a
variety of factors, “including the size of the criminal enterprise, the functions performed,
the position of the accused, the amount of time spent participating after acquiring
knowledge of the criminality of the system, efforts made to prevent criminal activity . . .
and the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed.”125 Summarizing its holding on
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the level of participation required to incur criminal liability under a joint criminal
enterprise, the Trial Chamber stated:
[A]n accused must have carried out acts that substantially assisted or significantly
effected the furtherance of the goals of the enterprise, with the knowledge that his
acts or omissions facilitated the crimes committed through the enterprise in order
to be criminally liable as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. The culpable
participant would not need to know of each crime committed. Merely knowing
that crimes are being committed within a system and knowingly participating in
that system in a way that substantially assists or facilitates the commission of a
crime or which allows the criminal enterprise to function effectively or efficiently
would be enough to establish criminal liability. The aider or abettor or coperpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise contributes to the commission of the
crimes by playing a role that allows the system or enterprise to continue its
functioning.126

Taking the above analysis into account, the Trial Chamber in Kvocka first found
that the Omarska camp functioned as a joint criminal enterprise. The court reasoned that
the crimes that took place in the Omarska camp were not only premeditated, but they
were also “serious crimes committed intentionally, maliciously, selectively, and in some
instances sadistically against the non-Serbs detained in the camp.”127 The camp had a
plurality of persons performing a variety of roles and functions of varying degrees of
importance. The intent to persecute the non-Serb detainees, which led to crimes
including murder, torture, and rape, amounted to joint criminal enterprise pervading the
camp.128 In addition, the Trial Chamber emphasized that anyone regularly working in or
visiting the Omarska camp would have to know that crimes pervaded the camp. Even if a
person did not actually witness the crimes, evidence of the abuses were evident in the
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bloody, injured and emaciated bodies of the prisoners and in the piles of dead bodies
present in the camp. The detainees’ screams of pain, cries of suffering and begging for
food or water provided additional evidence of the abuses.129 Before reaching the
culpability of the accused, the Trial Chamber made clear that “crimes committed in
furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise that were natural and foreseeable
consequences of the enterprise can be attributed to any who knowingly participated in a
significant way in the enterprise.”130
Kvocka was found responsible for the crimes committed in the Omarska camp.
He had knowledge of the criminal nature of the camp and yet willingly continued to work
each day in his position of authority and influence in the camp. As a result, Kvocka was
found to be substantially involved in the criminal enterprise and found to have actively
contributed to the everyday functioning and maintenance of the camp.131 Kvocka was
also convicted under Article 7(1) of the Statute for persecution as a crime against
humanity and for murder and torture as violations of the laws of customs of war. He was
sentenced to seven years imprisonment.132
Prcac was also found to have knowledge of the wide-scale abuses and violence
inflicted upon the detainees in the Omarska camp. Despite this knowledge, Prcac
continued to work at the camp for at least twenty-two days, performing the tasks required
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of him.133 Because he remained passive while crimes were being committed and because
his participation in the camp was significant, the Trial Chamber held that Prcac’s actions
as an administrative aid to the camp commander substantially contributed to and assisted
the facilitation of the joint criminal enterprise to persecute non-Serb detainees at the
Omarska camp.134 Prcac was found guilty of being a co-perpetrator in the joint criminal
enterprise and sentenced to five years imprisonment.135
Kos, a guard shift leader at the camp, was found to have played an important role
in making the camp function efficiently and effectively; therefore, he was a coperpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise. Kos incurred responsibility for the beating
and harassment of detainees through his active participation or his failure to stop the
crimes that were committed in his presence or by guards on his shift.136 Kos was given a
six-year imprisonment term.137
The final two accused were given much stricter penalties because of their direct
involvement in the infliction of abuses on the detainees. Radic, also a guard shift leader
at the camp, was in charge when some of the most gruesome acts against the detainees
took place, including sexual violence in which Radic took an active role.138 Like Kos, the
Trial Chamber determined that Radic’s actions played a crucial role in the efficient and
effective functioning of the camp. Not only was Radic responsible for the horrible
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crimes committed directly by him or by the guards working under him, but Radic was
also held responsible for perpetrating crimes of sexual violence against the female
detainees at the camp.139 Radic was sentenced to 20 years in prison.140
The final member of the accused, Zigic, received the most severe punishment.
Zigic, the taxi driver who visited the camps in order to abuse the detainees, was found
guilty of persecution, murder and torture.141 Zigic was involved in numerous physical
abuses not only at the Omarska Camp, but also the Keraterm and Trnopolje camps as
well.142 Zigic was found to be a co-perpetrator of the joint criminal enterprise and was
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.143
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber found that the Omarska camp functioned as a joint
criminal enterprise and each of the accused participated in a significant way in making
the camp function more effectively or efficiently. All five of the accused were convicted
of persecution as a crime against humanity for the variety of abuses and crimes
committed in the Omarska camp.

G. Krnojelac
While the cases examined above have all dealt with the accused being found
guilty of taking part in a joint criminal enterprise, the Tribunal’s willingness to find a
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joint criminal enterprise does have its limitations.144 The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac
found that the accused’s actions did not constitute participation in a joint criminal
enterprise because of a lack of shared intent and an absence of shared agreement among
the participants of the enterprise.145
In April 1992, Serb forces entered the town of Foca and began arresting Muslims
and non-Serbs. The Foca Kazneno-Popravni Dom (PK Dom), a prison, became the
primary detention center for the arrested non-Serbs. Milorad Krnojelac was warden of
the KP Dom from April 1992 until August of 1993. As warden, Krnojelac was in a
position superior to everyone else working in the camp.146 The Prosecution alleged that
Krnojelac was individually responsible under Article 7(1) of the Statute for, among other
things, persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds, torture, inhumane acts,
murder and imprisonment as a crime against humanity.147
Before deciding the culpability of Krnojelac, the Trial Chamber made findings
relevant to joint criminal enterprise law. The Trial Chamber described the first two
categories discussed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic as “basic forms” of the joint
criminal enterprise.148 Further, the Trial Chamber stated that a joint criminal enterprise
exists when there is an understanding or agreement between two or more persons that
they will commit a crime. The understanding or agreement, however, does not need to be
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express as its existence can be inferred from all the circumstances. Nor does the
understanding or agreement have to be reached any time before the crime is committed:
There are circumstances in which two or more persons participating together in a crime
may establish an unspoken understanding or agreement between them to commit a crime
at that present time.149 The Trial Chamber next found that a person participates in s joint
criminal enterprise either:
(i) by participating directly in the commission of the agreed crime itself (as a
principal offender);
(ii) by being present at the time when the crime is committed, and (with
knowledge that the crime is to be or is being committed) by intentionally assisting
or encouraging another participant in the joint criminal enterprise to commit that
crime; or
(iii) by acting in furtherance of a particular system in which the crime is
committed by reason of the accused’s position of authority or function, and with
knowledge of the nature of that system and intent to further that system.150
To prove the basic form of joint criminal enterprise, it must be shown that “each
of the persons charged and (if not one of those charged) the principal offender or
offenders had a common state of mind, that which is required for the crime.”151 Lastly,
the Trial Chamber pointed out that even though a particular crime charged has not been
specifically pleaded in the indictment as part of the basic joint criminal enterprise, a case
based upon the accused’s participation in the enterprise to commit that crime may still be
considered by the court if it is one of the crimes charged in the indictment and such a case
is included in the prosecution’s pre-trial brief.152
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Turning to Krnojelac’s culpability in the case, the Trial Chamber held for several
of the charges that Krnojelac had not participated in the joint criminal enterprise.
Although Krnojelac was the warden of KP Dom, which means that he held the senior
position within the prison and allowed civilians to be detained there, there was no
evidence that Krnojelac actually played any part in securing the detention of any of the
non-Serb detainees.153 In addition, the Trial Chamber found that Krnojelac did not share
the intent of the joint criminal enterprise to illegally imprison the detainees. The Trial
Chamber held that it was more appropriate to characterize Krnojelac as an aider and
abettor to the principle offenders of the joint criminal enterprise to illegally imprison nonSerbs.154
The prosecution next alleged that Krnojelac incurred responsibility for the
inhumane conditions and cruel treatment of the detainees as a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise. In order to establish liability on this basis, it must be shown that
Krnojelac entered into an agreement with the guards of KP Dom and the military
authorities to subject the non-Serb detainees to the inhumane conditions and cruel
treatment, and that each of the participants, including Krnojelac, shared the same intent of
this crime. The Trial Chamber was not convinced that Krnojelac entered into such an
agreement; therefore, he was not held responsible as a participant in the joint criminal
enterprise.155

152

Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 144 at ¶ 85 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

153

Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 144 at ¶ 126 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

154

Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 144 at ¶ 127 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

155

Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 144 at ¶ 170 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

42

The Trial Chamber also held that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that
Krnojelac entered into any agreement for a joint criminal enterprise to commit beatings
and torture against the non-Serb prisoners in KP Dom.156 Although Krnojelac must have
known that some of the detainees were being mistreated, he did not have reason to know
that the abuses were being inflicted as part of a joint criminal enterprise. Although
Krnojelac witnessed the torturing of an inmate, the Trial Chamber held that the isolated
incident did not oblige him to investigate the incident in such a way as to put him on
notice that others were being tortured in the KP Dom.157
Krnojelac also did not incur liability as a member of the joint criminal enterprise
to commit murder. Again, the prosecution did not establish that Krnojelac had an
agreement to commit murder with the military authorities and the guards at KP Dom.158
The Trial Chamber found no evidence showing Krnojelac had knowledge of the deaths of
any of the detainees.159
The prosecution also alleged that Krnojelac incurred criminal responsibility under
Article 7(1) as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise with guards and soldiers to
persecute the Muslim and other non-Serb detainees. Once again, the Trial Chamber
found insufficient evidence to conclude that Krnojelac shared the criminal intent and
agreed with the other participants to persecute the detainees. In addition, because it was
determined that Krnojelac did not share the intent to commit the underlying crimes of
persecution, such as murder, torture, inhumane acts, and cruel treatment, the crime of
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persecution could not be established on the basis of the underlying acts as part of a joint
criminal enterprise.160
In sum, Krnojelac was not convicted as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise
to commit torture, murder, imprisonment and inhumane acts because there was
insufficient evidence to prove the existence of an agreement between Krnojelac and the
other participants to commit the joint criminal enterprise and that he shared the same
intent as the other participants. Krnojelac, however, was convicted of other offenses and
was sentenced to 7 ½ years in prison.161

H. Krnojelac Appeals Chamber
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber and found
Krnojelac guilty as a co-perpetrator “for the crimes of persecution (imprisonment and
inhumane acts) and cruel treatment (based on living conditions imposed)”.162 The
Appeals Chamber also held Krnojelac guilty as an aider and abettor to the crimes.163 The
Appeals Chamber, when making its decision, took into account the fact that Krnojelac
was warden at KP Dom for 15 months, that he knew the non-Serbs were being unlawfully
detained because of their ethnicity and the guards and military authorities were
responsible for the inhuman conditions and abuses suffered by the detainees. The
Appeals Chamber also found that by failing to take preventative measures, Krnojelac was
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encouraging his subordinates to maintain those conditions and furthered the commission
of those acts.164 As a result of all those conditions, the Appeals Chamber held that a trier
of fact should reasonably have inferred that Krnojelac was part of the system and thereby
intended to further it.165
In making its decision, the Appeals Chamber made several key rulings. The
Appeals Chamber found that, with regard to the crimes considered within the second
category of cases in the Tadic judgment (also known as the “systemic form” of joint
criminal enterprise), “the intent of the participants other than the principal offenders
presupposes personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment (whether proven by
express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the accused’s position of
authority) and the intent to further the concerted system of ill-treatment.”166 It is less
important to prove that there was a formal agreement between the participants than to
prove their involvement in the system.167 The court also held that while the Appeals
Chamber in Tadic mainly drew from World War II concentration camp cases when
developing the systemic form of joint criminal enterprise, the systemic form can still be
applied to other cases and especially to serious violations of international humanitarian
law. “Although the perpetrators of the acts tried in the concentration camp cases were
mostly members of criminal organizations, the Tadic case did not require an individual to
164
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belong to such an organization in order to be considered a participant in the joint criminal
enterprise.”168

I. Milosevic
Participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a prominent feature in the indictment
of former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic.169 The indictment charges
Milosevic with participating, as a co-perpetrator, in a joint criminal enterprise with the
purpose of forcibly and permanently removing the majority of non-Serbs from large areas
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.170 Using the so-called “magic bullet of the Office of the
Prosecutor”, the prosecutor alleged that Milosevic participated in the joint criminal
enterprise with members of the Bosnian Serb military and civilian leaders.171
Applying joint criminal enterprise to the Milosevic case is important for the
prosecution because a joint criminal enterprise exists when an individual acts as part of a
system in which the crime is committed by reason of the person’s position of authority.172
Because an individual who participates in a joint criminal enterprise is guilty of any
crimes committed as part of that enterprise regardless of the role he plays, Milosevic
could be found guilty for the acts that others commit in pursuance of the criminal
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enterprise.173 Because Milosevic held such a dominant position “throughout the political
and military structures of what remained of Yugoslavia following the secession of
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, essentially all criminal acts
carried out by official or quasi official can be laid at his door.”174 The key, however, is to
prove the existence of a joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse the areas in
question.175 If the prosecution can establish that such a joint criminal enterprise existed,
then the only logical conclusion would be that Milosevic was the chief architect.176

IV. Conspiracy and Joint Criminal Enterprise
Although joint criminal enterprise and the doctrine of criminal complicity share
several similarities, the crimes themselves are substantively different. Conspiracy, just
like joint criminal enterprise, requires an “agreement” to commit a crime which can be
expressed or implied.177 However, the act of agreement constitutes the essence of the
conspiracy crime itself whereas joint criminal enterprise is used to extend criminal
liability beyond the common plan. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic found that joint
criminal enterprise is justified on the premise that the crimes laid out in the statute are
such serious violations of international law that liability should not be limited to those
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that carry out the actus reus for the enumerated crimes, but to other offenders as well.178
While both criminal doctrines impose liability on individuals for involvement with a
common plan, joint criminal enterprise extends its reach much further than criminal
conspiracy.

V. Conclusion
Although the Appeals Chamber in Tadic first developed the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise in 1999, the doctrine remains essentially unchanged to this day.179
The validity of the doctrine has been attacked several times before the Tribunal, yet joint
criminal enterprise continues to be applied more and more frequently. The doctrine has
become so valuable to prosecutors that joint criminal enterprise was even heavily relied
on as a form of liability in the indictment of former Yugoslav President Milosevic.
As with most legal doctrines, convictions under joint criminal enterprise are
determined by the circumstances of each case. However, those determinations are based
on a legal framework for joint criminal enterprise that is firmly established in the ICTY
case law. In summary, joint criminal enterprise has developed into the following:

Three categories of joint criminal enterprise have been identified by the ICTY:
- The first category is a “basic” form of joint criminal enterprise. It is represented by
cases where all co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same
178
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criminal intention. An example is a plan formulated by the participants in the joint
criminal enterprise to kill where, although each of the participants may carry out a
different role, each of them has the intent to kill.
- The second category is a “systemic” form of joint criminal enterprise. It is a variant of
the basic form, characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment. An
example is extermination or concentration camps, in which the prisoners are killed or
mistreated pursuant to the joint criminal enterprise.
- The third category is an “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise. It concerns cases
involving a common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators commits
an act which, while outside the common purpose, is nevertheless a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose. An example is a
common purpose or plan on the part of a group to forcibly remove at gun-point members
of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to effect “ethnic cleansing”) with the
consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and killed.
While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common
purpose, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint
might well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.
The actus reus of the participant in a joint criminal enterprise is common to each
of the three above categories and comprises the following three elements:
-

-

First, a plurality of persons is required. They need not be organized in a military,
political or administrative structure.
Second, the existence of a common purpose which amounts to or involves the
commission of a crime provided for in the Statute is required. There is no
necessity for this purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. It may
materialize extemporaneously and be inferred from the facts.
Third, the participation of the accused in the common purpose is required, which
involves the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This
participation need not involve commission of a specific crime under one of the
provisions (for example murder, extermination, torture or rape), but may take the
form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose.

However, the mens rea differs according to the category of joint criminal
enterprise under consideration:
-

With regard to the basic form of joint criminal enterprise what is required is the
intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all
co-perpetrators).

-

With regard to the systemic form of joint criminal enterprise (which, as noted
above, is a variant of the first), personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment
is required (whether proved by express testimony or a matter of reasonable
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inference from the accused’s position of authority), as well as the intent to further
this system of ill-treatment.
-

With regard to the extended form of joint criminal enterprise, what is required is
the intention to participate in and further the common criminal purpose of a group
and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission
of a crime by the group. In addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one
which was part of the common design arises only if, under the circumstances of
the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or
other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk– that is,
being aware that such crime was a possible consequence of the execution of that
enterprise, and with that awareness, the accused decided to participate in that
enterprise.
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